For a sample of my academic research, see below. Please contact me for more information or with any questions. To access my dissertation, click here.
Considering the role of second-order respect in deference to dominant actors (Reit & Gruenfeld, in press, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology)
Dominant actors are neither liked nor respected, yet they are reliably deferred to. Extant explanations of why dominant actors are deferred to focus on deferrer’s first-order judgments (i.e., the deferrer’s own private assessment of the dominant actor). The present research extends these accounts by considering the role of second-order judgments (i.e., an individual’s perception of what others think about the dominant actor) in decisions to defer to dominant actors. While individuals themselves have little respect for dominant actors, we hypothesized that (1) they think others respect dominant actors more than they do themselves, and (2) these second-order respect judgments are associated with their decision to defer dominant actors above and beyond their own first-order respect judgments. The results of four studies provide support for these hypotheses: across a variety of contexts, we found evidence that individuals think others respect dominant actors more than they themselves do (Studies 1-3), and perceptions of others’ respect for dominant actors is associated with individuals’ own decisions to defer to them, above and beyond first-order respect (Studies 3-4). Results highlight the importance of considering second-order judgments in order to fully understand why dominant actors achieve high social rank in groups and organizations.
Why dominance incites deference: A social norms account (Dannals, Reit, & Gruenfeld, working paper)
Behavioral displays of dominance are widely met with deference, but current social psychological accounts of responses to dominance are primarily built on dyadic interactions with a dominant actor—largely ignoring the impact of others’ reactions on one’s own deference decision. We extend these accounts by examining how and why an individual’s deference to a dominant actor is affected by a norm of deference indicated by others’ behavior. We propose that a norm of deference both affect the known pathways that predict deference to dominant actors (i.e., fear, competence assessments) via informational influence and also activate a set of normative influence considerations (i.e., desire for approval from the other deferrers). Study 1 examines how norms of deference towards dominant actors emerge in real groups using data from an online group chat platform. We test the hypothesis that norms of deference vary across groups despite consistency in a dominant confederate’s behavior in every group, suggesting that group members’ deference is not purely in response to the dominant actor but rather in part due to fellow group members’ own actions. Studies 2-3 test the informational and normative influence pathways, respectively. Study 4 tests the hypothesis that deference norms are uniquely potent in inciting deference towards dominant (vs. prestige) actors, because unlike deference towards prestige actors, deference towards dominant actors is misaligned with individuals’ private attitudes towards them. Collectively, these results highlight the important role norms of deference play in moderating the success of dominant actors.
From whom do we learn group norms? Low-ranking group members are perceived as the best sources (Dannals, Reit, & Miller, 2020, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes)
Social norm perception is ubiquitous in small groups and teams, but how individuals approach this process is not well understood. When individuals wish to perceive descriptive social norms in a group or team, whose advice and behavior do they prefer to rely on? Four lab studies and one field survey demonstrate that when individuals seek information about a team’s social norms they prefer to receive advice from lower-ranking individuals (Studies 1–4) and give greater weight to the observed behavior of lower-ranking individuals (Study 5). Results from correlation (Study 3) and moderation (Study 4) approaches suggest this preference stems from the assumption that lower-ranking team members are more attentive to and aware of the descriptive social norms of their team. Alternative mechanisms (e.g., perceived similarity to lower-ranking team members, greater honesty of lower-ranking team members) were also examined, but no support for these was found.
Dominant, open nonverbal displays are attractive at zero-acquaintance (Vacharkulksemsuk, Reit, Khambatta, Eastwick, Finkel & Carney, 2016, PNAS)
Across two field studies of romantic attraction, we demonstrate that postural expansiveness makes humans more romantically appealing. In a field study (n = 144 speed-dates), we coded nonverbal behaviors associated with liking, love, and dominance. Postural expansiveness— expanding the body in physical space--was most predictive of attraction, with each one-unit increase in coded behavior from the video recordings nearly doubling a person’s odds of getting a “yes” response from one’s speed-dating partner. In a subsequent field experiment (n = 3,000), we tested the causality of postural expansion (vs. contraction) on attraction using a popular Global Positioning System- based online-dating application. Mate-seekers rapidly flipped through photographs of potential sexual/date partners, selecting those they desired to meet for a date. Mate-seekers were significantly more likely to select partners displaying an expansive (vs. contractive) non- verbal posture. Mediation analyses demonstrate one plausible mechanism through which expansiveness is appealing: Expansiveness makes the dating candidate appear more dominant. In a dating world in which success sometimes is determined by a split-second decision rendered after a brief interaction or exposure to a static photograph, single persons have very little time to make a good impression. Our research suggests that a nonverbal dominance display increases a person’s chances of being selected as a potential mate.
The (missing) link between ambition and leader effectiveness (Alzahawi, Reit, & Flynn, under review)
Are highly ambitious individuals more capable leaders? In three studies drawing from simulated and actual leadership behaviors, we find no evidence of a link between personal ambition and leadership aptitude; rather, using Bayesian statistics, we find stronger support for a null relationship. Experts judged more-ambitious MBA students participating in a leadership skills competition as no more effective in a leadership role than their less-ambitious peers (Study 1). Likewise, in a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults asked to lead a small team in a simulated leadership task, we find no evidence of a connection between ambition and effectiveness (Study 2). Finally, in an archival dataset of leadership evaluations, high-aspiring individuals rated themselves as more capable leaders than their low-aspiring peers. However, evaluations of leadership effectiveness from direct reports, peers, and managers were no more positive for more ambitious executives (Study 3). We consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for scholars and practitioners interested in leadership selection.
The aspiration to rank second (Reit, Gruenfeld, & Monin, working paper)
The desire for status is universal, and most research on status striving assumes that people aspire to attain the highest social rank possible. In contrast, we hypothesize that many people aspire to rank second more than first on the dimension of status and influence. The second rank has unique appeal, we argue, because it offers the benefits of a high rank without the psychological burdens associated the first rank that come with being responsible for the group. Studies 1-2 document a modal preference for the second rank in naturally-occurring groups. Studies 3-4 examined three mechanisms regarding potential sources of anxiety associated with the highest rank—hampering group performance, receiving negative judgment, and greater workload—using a combination of correlational and experimental methods. Together, we find evidence supporting a more complex set of motivations underlying individuals’ status-striving behavior in groups than the assumption that individuals are ceaselessly upward-striving.
The Commonness Fallacy: Commonly chosen options have less choice appeal than people think (Reit & Critcher, 2020, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology)
In predicting what others are likely to choose (e.g., vanilla ice cream or tiramisu), people can display a commonness fallacy—overestimating how often common (but bland) options (e.g., vanilla ice cream) will be chosen over rarer (but exciting) options (e.g., tiramisu). Given common items are often chosen merely because they are frequently offered, not because they are preferred (tiramisu is rarely offered as a dessert), commonness is not necessarily diagnostic of future choice. Studies 1a and 1b document the commonness fallacy in forecasts of single and repeated choices. Study 2 replicates it in an incentive- compatible choice context. Studies 3 and 4 uncover when and why perceived commonness is relied upon. Perceived commonness is spontaneously used as a guide when forecasting others’ choices (as though people blur what has been chosen with what people will choose), but not when forecasting what others would be pleased to receive. Choice forecasters leaned upon perceived commonness over and above many other cues, including their own choices, the goods’ prices, and even how much others were thought to like each option. Upon conscious reflection, choice forecasters abandon commonness and gravitate toward more normatively defensible input. Studies 5 and 6 used correlational and experimental methods, respectively, to examine antecedents of the commonness fallacy. Study 7 illustrates a literally costly consequence: A 2-part marketplace simulation study found amateur sellers’ reliance on perceived commonness prompted them to systematically misprice goods.
Considering the role of second-order respect in deference to dominant actors (Reit & Gruenfeld, in press, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology)
Dominant actors are neither liked nor respected, yet they are reliably deferred to. Extant explanations of why dominant actors are deferred to focus on deferrer’s first-order judgments (i.e., the deferrer’s own private assessment of the dominant actor). The present research extends these accounts by considering the role of second-order judgments (i.e., an individual’s perception of what others think about the dominant actor) in decisions to defer to dominant actors. While individuals themselves have little respect for dominant actors, we hypothesized that (1) they think others respect dominant actors more than they do themselves, and (2) these second-order respect judgments are associated with their decision to defer dominant actors above and beyond their own first-order respect judgments. The results of four studies provide support for these hypotheses: across a variety of contexts, we found evidence that individuals think others respect dominant actors more than they themselves do (Studies 1-3), and perceptions of others’ respect for dominant actors is associated with individuals’ own decisions to defer to them, above and beyond first-order respect (Studies 3-4). Results highlight the importance of considering second-order judgments in order to fully understand why dominant actors achieve high social rank in groups and organizations.
Why dominance incites deference: A social norms account (Dannals, Reit, & Gruenfeld, working paper)
Behavioral displays of dominance are widely met with deference, but current social psychological accounts of responses to dominance are primarily built on dyadic interactions with a dominant actor—largely ignoring the impact of others’ reactions on one’s own deference decision. We extend these accounts by examining how and why an individual’s deference to a dominant actor is affected by a norm of deference indicated by others’ behavior. We propose that a norm of deference both affect the known pathways that predict deference to dominant actors (i.e., fear, competence assessments) via informational influence and also activate a set of normative influence considerations (i.e., desire for approval from the other deferrers). Study 1 examines how norms of deference towards dominant actors emerge in real groups using data from an online group chat platform. We test the hypothesis that norms of deference vary across groups despite consistency in a dominant confederate’s behavior in every group, suggesting that group members’ deference is not purely in response to the dominant actor but rather in part due to fellow group members’ own actions. Studies 2-3 test the informational and normative influence pathways, respectively. Study 4 tests the hypothesis that deference norms are uniquely potent in inciting deference towards dominant (vs. prestige) actors, because unlike deference towards prestige actors, deference towards dominant actors is misaligned with individuals’ private attitudes towards them. Collectively, these results highlight the important role norms of deference play in moderating the success of dominant actors.
From whom do we learn group norms? Low-ranking group members are perceived as the best sources (Dannals, Reit, & Miller, 2020, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes)
Social norm perception is ubiquitous in small groups and teams, but how individuals approach this process is not well understood. When individuals wish to perceive descriptive social norms in a group or team, whose advice and behavior do they prefer to rely on? Four lab studies and one field survey demonstrate that when individuals seek information about a team’s social norms they prefer to receive advice from lower-ranking individuals (Studies 1–4) and give greater weight to the observed behavior of lower-ranking individuals (Study 5). Results from correlation (Study 3) and moderation (Study 4) approaches suggest this preference stems from the assumption that lower-ranking team members are more attentive to and aware of the descriptive social norms of their team. Alternative mechanisms (e.g., perceived similarity to lower-ranking team members, greater honesty of lower-ranking team members) were also examined, but no support for these was found.
Dominant, open nonverbal displays are attractive at zero-acquaintance (Vacharkulksemsuk, Reit, Khambatta, Eastwick, Finkel & Carney, 2016, PNAS)
Across two field studies of romantic attraction, we demonstrate that postural expansiveness makes humans more romantically appealing. In a field study (n = 144 speed-dates), we coded nonverbal behaviors associated with liking, love, and dominance. Postural expansiveness— expanding the body in physical space--was most predictive of attraction, with each one-unit increase in coded behavior from the video recordings nearly doubling a person’s odds of getting a “yes” response from one’s speed-dating partner. In a subsequent field experiment (n = 3,000), we tested the causality of postural expansion (vs. contraction) on attraction using a popular Global Positioning System- based online-dating application. Mate-seekers rapidly flipped through photographs of potential sexual/date partners, selecting those they desired to meet for a date. Mate-seekers were significantly more likely to select partners displaying an expansive (vs. contractive) non- verbal posture. Mediation analyses demonstrate one plausible mechanism through which expansiveness is appealing: Expansiveness makes the dating candidate appear more dominant. In a dating world in which success sometimes is determined by a split-second decision rendered after a brief interaction or exposure to a static photograph, single persons have very little time to make a good impression. Our research suggests that a nonverbal dominance display increases a person’s chances of being selected as a potential mate.
The (missing) link between ambition and leader effectiveness (Alzahawi, Reit, & Flynn, under review)
Are highly ambitious individuals more capable leaders? In three studies drawing from simulated and actual leadership behaviors, we find no evidence of a link between personal ambition and leadership aptitude; rather, using Bayesian statistics, we find stronger support for a null relationship. Experts judged more-ambitious MBA students participating in a leadership skills competition as no more effective in a leadership role than their less-ambitious peers (Study 1). Likewise, in a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults asked to lead a small team in a simulated leadership task, we find no evidence of a connection between ambition and effectiveness (Study 2). Finally, in an archival dataset of leadership evaluations, high-aspiring individuals rated themselves as more capable leaders than their low-aspiring peers. However, evaluations of leadership effectiveness from direct reports, peers, and managers were no more positive for more ambitious executives (Study 3). We consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for scholars and practitioners interested in leadership selection.
The aspiration to rank second (Reit, Gruenfeld, & Monin, working paper)
The desire for status is universal, and most research on status striving assumes that people aspire to attain the highest social rank possible. In contrast, we hypothesize that many people aspire to rank second more than first on the dimension of status and influence. The second rank has unique appeal, we argue, because it offers the benefits of a high rank without the psychological burdens associated the first rank that come with being responsible for the group. Studies 1-2 document a modal preference for the second rank in naturally-occurring groups. Studies 3-4 examined three mechanisms regarding potential sources of anxiety associated with the highest rank—hampering group performance, receiving negative judgment, and greater workload—using a combination of correlational and experimental methods. Together, we find evidence supporting a more complex set of motivations underlying individuals’ status-striving behavior in groups than the assumption that individuals are ceaselessly upward-striving.
The Commonness Fallacy: Commonly chosen options have less choice appeal than people think (Reit & Critcher, 2020, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology)
In predicting what others are likely to choose (e.g., vanilla ice cream or tiramisu), people can display a commonness fallacy—overestimating how often common (but bland) options (e.g., vanilla ice cream) will be chosen over rarer (but exciting) options (e.g., tiramisu). Given common items are often chosen merely because they are frequently offered, not because they are preferred (tiramisu is rarely offered as a dessert), commonness is not necessarily diagnostic of future choice. Studies 1a and 1b document the commonness fallacy in forecasts of single and repeated choices. Study 2 replicates it in an incentive- compatible choice context. Studies 3 and 4 uncover when and why perceived commonness is relied upon. Perceived commonness is spontaneously used as a guide when forecasting others’ choices (as though people blur what has been chosen with what people will choose), but not when forecasting what others would be pleased to receive. Choice forecasters leaned upon perceived commonness over and above many other cues, including their own choices, the goods’ prices, and even how much others were thought to like each option. Upon conscious reflection, choice forecasters abandon commonness and gravitate toward more normatively defensible input. Studies 5 and 6 used correlational and experimental methods, respectively, to examine antecedents of the commonness fallacy. Study 7 illustrates a literally costly consequence: A 2-part marketplace simulation study found amateur sellers’ reliance on perceived commonness prompted them to systematically misprice goods.